

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE CHINESE CENTURY: SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS – CHANGE,
CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

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ABSTRACT

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The emergence of China -- politically, militarily, and economically -- is fundamentally altering the importance of the relationship between China and the United States. This paper explains why Sino-American relations are critical to the future of the United States; defines the competing visions for American strategy towards China; analyzes these alternative strategies; evaluates the current strategy; and makes recommendations based on the preceding analysis and evaluation. This examination concludes that at the beginning of what may be the “Chinese Century,” the United States should continue to pursue relations guided by the principles of cooperative security, enduring American values, and common bilateral interests.

THE CHINESE CENTURY: SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS – CHANGE, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In the last decade of the 20th Century -- a century some historians have labeled the "American Century" -- the United States reached new heights of power and influence in the world.¹ The ascendancy of the United States that started early in the century attained a new level in the last decade of the century following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the contraction of the Japanese economy, and the 'stagnation' of the Western European economies. In recent history, no one state has held such a paramount position as the United States has held since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States, at the zenith of its power, has seen itself as a benevolent hegemon. Other nations may question that characterization but do see the United States as the lone superpower in the world. This understanding of its unique position in the world has fundamentally influenced American foreign policy. Now, at the beginning of a new century, American politicians, economists, business and labor leaders, academics, and policy writers cast their eyes around the world to China and see the rise of a potential peer competitor.² The emergence of China is changing the importance of Sino-American relations, exacerbating old challenges, and creating new opportunities. This paper explains why Sino-American relations are critical to the future of the United States; defines the competing visions for American strategy towards China; analyzes these alternative strategies; evaluates the current strategy; and makes recommendations based on the preceding analysis and evaluation. This examination concludes that at the beginning of what may be the "Chinese Century," the United States should continue to pursue relations guided by the principles of cooperative security, enduring American values, and common bilateral interests.

What has changed

The emergence of China -- politically, militarily, and economically -- is fundamentally altering the importance of the relationship between China and the United States. China's massive population (1.3 billion -- about twenty percent of the world's population), enormous Gross Domestic Product (\$7.26 trillion), impressive average annual economic growth rate (8-10 percent), growing importance in international trade (currently ranked third), vast size (9.3 million square kilometers), massive energy requirements (ranked second in the world in total consumption), huge daily foreign oil consumption (2.4 million barrels-a-day), and geographically strategic location (bordering on important countries such as Russia, North Korea, Burma, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan), make Sino-American relations critical to

the future of the United States.³ Everything about China is on a grand scale. In his recent book, *China, Inc.*, veteran journalist and former commodities trader, Ted Fishman observes , “China has between 100 and 160 cities with populations of 1 million or more”⁴ He further notes that some experts believe that China's population may be closer to 1.5 billion than the 1.3 billion official census estimates.⁵ The difference between these figures would equal “the population of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined.”⁶ China matters because of the current and future potential of its massive, hard-working, and well-educated population. However, this potential is just one of the factors that make Sino-American relations critical to the future of both countries.

Economic, military, diplomatic, historic, and geopolitical factors also make China an important world power and thus Sino-American relations crucial to the United States. Events in China over the past twenty years have made it impossible to ignore China. China's recent economic expansion has been nothing short of spectacular. Rapid, almost unprecedented, industrialization and modernization, double-digit growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), low unemployment, and huge trade surpluses are the object of envy and often resentment throughout much of the world.⁷ The dramatic transformation of the Chinese economy from an essentially agrarian, subsistence-economy to an emerging, modern, highly capitalized, industrial-power has given rise to calls for protectionism, containment, and wide-ranging fear that she will translate her newfound economic strength into military capacity and international political influence.⁸ China is a formidable regional military power. She possesses a small strategic nuclear arsenal capable of targeting virtually all of the United States, a large and regionally significant navy, an air force with over 2,500 combat aircraft, and a large standing army.⁹

China has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and is a participating member in many of the significant international organizations including the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and others.¹⁰ China has worked hard developing bilateral and multilateral relations throughout Asia and the rest of the world.¹¹ Current Chinese leaders have a reputation for being well educated, culturally savvy, diplomatically astute, and “less entrenched in ideological dogma” than their predecessors.¹² Additionally, there are historic, cultural, and geopolitical factors that contribute to China's important position in Asia and the world. China, the “Middle Kingdom,” has historically been a center of power, influence, culture, and education in Asia. The Chinese invented paper, printing, gunpowder, and the compass.¹³ Written Chinese (the world's longest continuously used written language) influenced the development of written languages in much of East and Southeast Asia.¹⁴ The

Chinese contributed significantly to science and invention, governance, and religion. (China is the home to Daoism, Confucianism (Rujia), and contributed significantly to the spread of Buddhism (Fojiao).) Finally, ethnic Chinese constitute a majority in Singapore and a significant minority in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.¹⁵

The conventional wisdom is that it would be foolish and perhaps perilous to ignore China's continuing emergence. However, as Nicholas D. Kristof, a prominent columnist and former Beijing Bureau Chief for *The New York Times* warned over ten years ago,

Yet the international community is not giving adequate consideration to the colossal implications – economic, political, environmental and even military – of the rise of a powerful China. It is fashionable these days for people to express wonderment at how the changes underway in China are breathtaking, but there is little specific analysis of the economic, environmental and military effects of China's growth. Nor is there much analysis of whether China's attempt to expand its influence reflects the hostile intentions of an aggressive regime or is simply the consequence of rising power.¹⁶

Marietta College professor and director of international programs, Yi Xiaoxing, concluded recently that Kristof's observation is still accurate.¹⁷ China may not be a peer competitor, but many experts agree that the day is coming.¹⁸

The American Public's Renewed Interest in China

Throughout 2005, the American media devoted a significant amount of time to coverage of China and Sino-American relations. Numerous newspaper headlines, television news stories, magazine articles, and books captured the attention and imagination of the public.¹⁹ Several factors contributed to this heightened interest in China and Sino-American relations including: continuing public debate on the merits of 'Globalization'; a dramatic increase in the price of gasoline; a series of Chinese attempted or successful acquisitions of American companies -- principally the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation's (CNOOC) bid for the U.S. oil company, Unocal; Haier's bid for U.S. manufacturer, Maytag; and Lenovo's takeover of IBM's personal computer division; the continuing migration of American manufacturing jobs; public pronouncements by a group of U.S. Senators led by Senator Charles E. Schumer (D) from New York, and Lindsey Graham (R) from South Carolina, concerning their tariff bill to "level the playing field" with China; and President Bush's trip to China.²⁰ *New York Times* columnist and acclaimed author, Thomas Friedman, contributed to the public debate on "Globalization" with his book, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*.²¹ In this book, Friedman attempted to describe and explain to the American reader the forces of globalization sweeping the world. China, naturally, figured prominently in his book.²² Public outcry over

higher gasoline prices in the United States prompted energy company executives, economists, and administration officials to explain that the higher prices were largely the result of higher international crude oil prices caused by increased worldwide demand. These officials and commentators further explained that much of this increased demand was from China.²³ For many Americans, ignorant of China's transition from oil exporter to oil importer in the 1990's, the news that China was now the second largest importer in the world came as an unpleasant surprise.²⁴ At the same time, in the summer of 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham introduced the "China Free Trade bill" -- legislation to impose a 27.5% across-the-board tariff on Chinese products entering the United States -- and announced Senate hearings on the subject of China trade.²⁵ These events highlighted the importance of Sino-American relations to the American public, but tended to emphasize the negative aspects -- the challenges -- in the relationship.

The Challenges

Sino-American relations face many challenges including economic competition, human rights issues, apprehension concerning Chinese military modernization, and the always-present problem of Taiwan. In many quarters of American society, trade issues -- economic competition -- are the paramount concerns. Some politicians reason that "all politics are local politics," and a recent American President ran on the unofficial campaign slogan, "It's the economy, stupid."²⁶ Economic competition with China and the actual or perceived impacts on local economic conditions are a major concern for many Americans. American leaders worry about the trade deficit between China and America. A related concern is currency valuation. More precisely the disagreement is over the exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and the Renminbi Yuan.²⁷ The perceived migration of American textile and light industry jobs to China is another source of apprehension in many quarters.²⁸ Finally, the United States and China have disputes over the protection of intellectual property rights of American copyrighted materials.²⁹

A second general category of challenges for Sino-American relations is human rights. The issue of human rights comes directly from our national beliefs and values, which drive our stated objective of spreading liberty and democracy. In an article for *American Foreign Policy Interests*, University of California professor and noted China expert, Robert A. Scalapino, writes,

Human rights issues also have reemerged despite China's general progress on this front. In the past two decades, China has evolved from a rigid authoritarianism to an authoritarian-pluralistic society -- with rights of speech, publication, and other liberties considerably expanded—but it is not a democracy, nor is it likely to be such in the foreseeable future.³⁰

Chinese military modernization causes apprehension in Congress and elsewhere. Some members of the U.S. Congress are so concerned about the Chinese military that they require the Secretary of Defense to present an annual report specifically on, "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China."³¹ Additionally, authors have published numerous books and articles on the subject including *Washington Times* national security reporter, Bill Gertz's bestseller, *The China Threat: How the People's Republic targets America*, Steven Mosher's, *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World*, and Robert D. Kaplan's article in the June 2005 issue of *The Atlantic*, "How We Would Fight China."³²

Finally, Taiwan remains a significant and potentially the most perilous source of tension between China and the United States.³³ Taiwan presents the issue most likely to trigger a military conflict between the United States and China. The Taiwan Relations Act codifies official United States' policy towards Taiwan.³⁴ This law states that it is necessary,

to make clear that the United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to peace and security of the Western Pacific and a grave concern to the United States³⁵

The act does not define a peaceful solution to the conflict between Beijing and Taipei as a vital national interest, but it comes very close. Tensions between China and Taiwan came to the front during Taiwan's recent Presidential election and proposed constitutional amendment.³⁶ Leaders in Beijing insisted that campaign statements made by Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian and a public referendum he proposed constituted a call for independence.³⁷ They believed that President Chen's actions directly challenged their policy that Taiwan is an integral part of China and they called for a return to the recognition of the "one China, two systems" policy.³⁸ Chinese leaders in Beijing and Taipei have given indications that they are not content with the status quo.

The challenges facing American policy makers are difficult and complex. The question for American policy makers is "What are the best policies for addressing these challenges?" Before they can answer this question, policy makers need to identify an overarching strategy to guide these policies.

Competing Strategies for Future Sino-American Relations

The central subject of this essay is Sino-American relations -- the bilateral relationship -- but American foreign policy formulators must examine this relationship in the context of an

overarching strategy for American foreign relations. Several possible strategies exist to guide current and future Sino-American relations. Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor and acknowledged national security expert, Barry Posen, and Berkley economics professor, Andrew Ross, identify, define, and analyze four strategies that are "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy."³⁹ The four strategies are -- Primacy, Cooperative Security, Selective Engagement, and Neo-Isolationism.⁴⁰ The following section uses the analytic framework of Posen and Ross to examine the competing strategic visions available to American decision makers to guide Sino-American relations.

Primacy

The first vision for American strategy towards China can be termed primacy. This vision supposes that the United States has a vested interest in remaining the sole superpower or at least cannot tolerate the rise of China to a level of peer competitor. The policy objective -- ends -- of this vision is maintaining the United States' current position as the world's only superpower. Perhaps renowned national security expert and author Samuel Huntington expresses this vision best,

A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to welfare and security of Americans and to the future freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.⁴¹

Some pundits believe this is the central objective of the current National Security Strategy and governs policy formulation concerning China. When applied to Sino-American relations this *Pax America* strategy calls for the United States to use all of the elements of its national power - military, information, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic -- to control, disrupt, and sabotage Chinese ascendancy with the end of remaining the world's sole superpower.

Cooperative Security

The second possible strategy, of the four, can be termed cooperative security. The guiding ideal of cooperative security is liberalism.⁴² Cooperative security starts from the premise that the United States "has a huge national interest in world peace."⁴³ Advocates of this school support action through international institutions whenever possible, as the best means to thwart and deter aggression.⁴⁴ Collective security advocates believe the world is strategically interdependent.⁴⁵ They rely increasingly on international institutions, particularly

the United Nations, to coordinate collective action.⁴⁶ This strategy asserts that the United States has both altruistic and selfish interests in a strong and prosperous China that is fully integrated into the world. Therefore, rather than concentrating the elements of national power on preventing China's emergence, this course of action would focus on the continued development, expansion, and strengthening of the international institutions -- the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and others -- necessary for the United States and the rest of the world to prosper in an environment that would otherwise be dominated by Chinese economic, political, and possibly military power. This strategy seeks fundamentally, to advance interdependence. Policy formulators guided by this strategy would use the elements of national power to further globalization and interdependence. Diplomats would continue to pursue international agreements (treaties). The President and the Congress might reduce the military and restructure it to increase its efficiency in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.

Selective Engagement

The third alternative strategy is selective engagement. The advocates of this strategy have their analytical anchor in "traditional balance of power realism."⁴⁷ Selective engagement seeks balance of power to ensure peace among the great powers.⁴⁸ Selective engagement holds that any great power such as China is a danger to the United States. Advocates believe that the United States has demonstrated an inability to stay out of large European and Asian Wars and thus has a vital interest in great power peace.⁴⁹ Finally, as Posen and Ross point out, selective engagement recognizes that,

Moreover, short of a compelling argument about an extant threat, the people of the United States are unlikely to want to invest much money or many lives either in global police duties -- cooperative security -- or in trying to cow others into accepting U.S. hegemony -- primacy.⁵⁰

The supporters of selective engagement recognize the intrinsic value of a modern, prosperous China but believe self-interest and potentially self-preservation require the United States maintain a balance of power with an emerging China. This approach to the Sino-American relationship allows U.S. policy makers to pursue both pragmatic economic and political-ideological goals. The desired end state would be an economically prosperous China that had neither the desire nor the diplomatic and military capacity to challenge the United States' supremacy in the region. This strategy requires policy makers to use the elements of U.S. national power to maintain a balance of power with China through bilateral agreements with the Chinese (SALT-style treaties) and new or reinvigorated regional alliances to counter

Chinese power. The emphasis would be on encouraging a prosperous Chinese economy while containing potential Chinese military and diplomatic power. In many ways, this strategy is an updated containment strategy or a strategy of “Modified Engagement.”⁵¹ American policy would “encourage the good outcomes while hedging against the unfavorable ones.”⁵²

Neo-isolationism

The last of the four possible overarching strategies is neo-isolationism. The neo-isolationists reject internationalism. Fundamentally, this school of thought avoids “entanglements in the affairs of others.”⁵³ They think that the question presented by the title of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s book, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, is irrelevant because the answer is neither.⁵⁴ The neo-isolationists adopt a narrow view of U.S. national interests. They acknowledge the protection of “the security, liberty, and property of the American people” as the only vital U.S. interest.⁵⁵ They believe that following the collapse of the Soviet Union no country has the power to threaten the United States because American nuclear weapons and geographic isolation, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, make it almost impossible for any nation to defeat the United States militarily.⁵⁶ They believe that the U.S. controls enough of the world economy to “go it alone.”⁵⁷ They hold that because there are no real threats to the American way of life and the U.S. is relatively self-sufficient there are few if any justifications for international meddling or foreign interventions.⁵⁸ They reject the notion that the U.S. has any responsibility for maintaining world order. Finally, neo-isolationists believe “ill-advised crusades” to promote democracy and human rights are self-defeating and only serve to inspire resentment.⁵⁹ A neo-isolationist strategy towards China would include ending security guarantees with Taiwan and removing much if not all of the American military presence from Korea, Japan, and the rest of East Asia. Primarily, the private sector would handle the economic challenges. Policies to promote democracy in China would end.

Analysis of the Possible Strategies

At some level of understanding, any evaluation of the competing strategies defined above, must begin with the questions, “How great is the threat poised by China?” and, “What is the nature of the threat?” These questions are critical because if China is an immediate threat to American security or the American way of life, then policy makers have fewer options. This was the case during the Cold War when assessments indicated that the Soviet Union presented a clear, immediate, and long-term threat to the American way of life at a minimum and possibly the very survival of the nation. The United States adopted a strategy of containment that had high associated costs but appeared to offer the only possibility of success. Noted China expert

and member of the National Committee's Roundtable on U.S. -- China -- Taiwan relations, Robert A. Scalapino, believes current relations between China and the United States "are positive, reflective of the national interests of both parties."⁶⁰ On the subject of China's leadership he writes,

China currently has a fourth-generation leadership, more pragmatic than ideological and strongly committed to tackling China's domestic problems: unemployment; the rural-urban gap and difficulties facing a majority of China's farmers; a fragile banking-financial system, with a possible 50 percent of outstanding bank loans nonperforming; and corruption still a massive problem.⁶¹

Many observers support his view that the Chinese leadership is intensely nationalistic but pragmatic and genuinely committed to peaceful relations with its neighbors and the United States. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology professors, David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, demonstrate convincingly that many of China's current diplomatic and military activities result from dependence on foreign oil.⁶² China's actions are in keeping with a nation attempting to diversify and secure energy supplies.⁶³ China is now the second largest importer of oil in the world.⁶⁴ The United States can expect China to build a "blue water" navy to protect perceived vital interests -- including the Arabian Gulf, the Straits of Malacca and other key ocean routes. Additionally, the United States should expect China to enter into relations and business ties with any nation that is a potential source of oil. This is not primarily a threat to the United States, but the predictable action of a country seeking to secure a vital resource. China's ongoing efforts to diversify and secure energy supplies are similar to actions pursued by the United States following the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

On the subject of China's military, the director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, Ivan Eland concludes, "Although many alarmist articles in the press have trumpeted improvements in the Chinese military, those enhancements are pockets of modernization in a largely antiquated force."⁶⁵ Many authors, including Brookings Institute Senior Fellow and Chinese foreign policy expert, David Shambaugh, in his recent book, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, support this view.⁶⁶ The majority view of experts on the subject is that China is not an immediate, clear, and present danger to American national security.⁶⁷ This means that all four possible strategies are potentially viable.

Primacy

The analysis of primacy should begin with an understanding that the United States' status as the world's lone superpower was not the result of a deliberate plan. Former Ambassador to China, J. Stapleton Roy, in prepared remarks, astutely observed, "(The United States) has been

cast into the role of the world's sole superpower without a consensus, . . . , on how this power should be used."⁶⁸ He continued to explain, "We were thrust into the role of the world's sole superpower not by conquest but because of the unraveling of our principal opponent" ⁶⁹ Simply stated, the United States found itself in a position it did not seek conscientiously. Observers must see American national power in a global perspective. The United States controls impressive resources but they are modest fractions compared to the world gross capability. American economic power is immense but our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represents less than a quarter of the combined, world GDP.⁷⁰ The American population and military are large but similar in size to those of the European Union.⁷¹ The United States is powerful but certainly not omnipotent. There are real limits to American power and influence.

The objective of primacy – preventing the rise of a peer competitor so that the United States remains the world's sole superpower – would require the expenditure of significant resources. This may exceed the means available to the United States. Ambassador Roy believes that, "U.S. resources are not sufficient to maintain a hegemonic position in the world."⁷² Posen and Ross estimate that the United States would need a military force similar in size to the Cold War force.⁷³ An estimate of personnel costs could run to an additional ninety billion dollars a year.⁷⁴ The Congressional Budget Office notes that discretionary spending must decline over the next twenty years as mandatory spending for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid continue to grow.⁷⁵

Ambassador Roy judges that there are other costs. These costs are harder to define but real and significant. He reasons that "being the 'sole superpower' will lead to abuse of that power if it is not constrained in some fashion."⁷⁶ He further indicates that primacy conflicts with the fundamental principles – the enduring beliefs, ethics, and values of the nation.⁷⁷ The intellectual capital, talent, and recently unleashed potential of 1.3 billion Chinese citizens are the engine driving China's rise. The long dormant potential of the huge Chinese population combined with newfound optimism and rising expectations are the elements of China's economic miracle.⁷⁸ The hopes and dreams of Chinese citizens cannot; and more importantly should not, be countered by any combination of U.S. policies. The newfound optimism of the Chinese is largely the result of Chinese governmental economic reforms and policies that the American government has long championed -- free trade, market economies, universal public education, free enterprise, and private ownership. American policy makers would need to oppose these economic ideals cherished and advocated by the United States for generations to prevent China from becoming a peer competitor. If policy makers can set aside the moral issues of thwarting the aspirations and future prosperity of a significant percent of the world's

population, there are still implications for American credibility in the court of international opinion. American power would likely face checks and balances in the form of international coalitions and alliances.

Theoretically, the American government could craft a combination of trade sanctions, tariffs, exclusionary trade alliances, embargoes, and controls on technology transfers that would inhibit the emerging Chinese economy. However, this theoretical construct ignores the fact that Americans benefit from Sino-American trade. The United States is an important trading partner and could disrupt and delay Chinese economic growth. However, the United States would need the cooperation and assistance of a substantial number of Pacific Rim, European, and Asian countries to implement an effective economic program to devastate the Chinese economy. During the Cold War, the United States was successful in obtaining this level of cooperation against the Soviet Union because many world leaders agreed that Moscow was a clear and imminent threat to their security. Most American allies do not see China as a threat to their security. The desired goal of primacy would be expensive and is not in keeping with American enduring beliefs and values.

Cooperative Security

Advocates and critics of cooperative security debate the advantages and disadvantages of the requisite international institutions. Critics disparage the effectiveness of the United Nations and worry about limits on U.S. national sovereignty and independent action. Following the greatest calamity of the 20th Century, World War II, the United States was the principal architect and most outspoken champion of a new international order – based on collective security. The United States worked hard to establish the United Nations and to negotiate the United Nations Charter.⁷⁹ Additionally, the United States worked to build an international economic system based on a liberal economic theory of peace. As noted by James C. Hsiung,

The theory consists of two arguments; namely, (a) that free trade substantially reduces the number of targets to which force might be applied in the pursuit of state interests; and (b) that free trade increases the vulnerability of actors, because of their increased interdependence, making them disinclined to resorting to force.⁸⁰

In short, economic interdependence decreases the probability for war. The system the United States has championed has continued to evolve over time; but has served as a basis for international cooperation for half a century. The principal argument against using this strategy is that the United States must concede power to the institutions.

Selective Engagement

Some have argued that selective engagement is the current guiding American strategy towards China. In an article for *Far Eastern Affairs*, deputy editor-in-chief Andrei Davydov writes that this strategy is at the heart of current policy towards China.⁸¹ He believes that the United States “continues to cherish the U.S.’s Asian alliances as the central point in America’s continuing military presence, as well as ‘the foundations of regional peace and stability’.”⁸² He notes that the Chinese tend to see these alliances “as a threat to peace, aggressive by nature.”⁸³ A balance of power approach has problems. This strategy lacks the idealistic appeal inherent in cooperative security or the enthusiastic nationalism of primacy making it difficult to build domestic political support. Selective engagement harkens back to the European great powers struggles of the 19th and early 20th Centuries. Posen and Ross ask, “Can such a strategy sustain the support of a liberal democracy long addicted to viewing international relations as the struggle between good and evil?”⁸⁴ This strategy has little acceptance in the court of world opinion. A United Nations report on collective security asserts, “There is little evident international acceptance of the idea of security being best preserved by a balance of power, or by any single – even benignly motivated superpower.”⁸⁵ Another potential problem with this approach towards China is identifying suitable partners or allies to balance against China. East and Southeast Asia have few countries with the capacity or willingness to fill the role. To what countries can the United States turn? Australia, Japan, Vietnam, Korea, and Russia are all potential candidates but lack either the capacity or the willingness. Finally, this strategy appears to doom the United States to another century of the same types of conflicts and dilemmas it faced during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Neo-isolationism

This strategy although hypothetically possible and historically favored by many of America’s Founding Fathers and early leaders is probably no longer relevant in today’s globalized world. The economic and military power of the United States, combined with its geographic isolation, and incredible natural resources do convey a degree of independence not practical to much of the world. The United States possesses enough arable land and water resources to be self-sufficient in food. The United States can avoid foreign intervention to a large extent. However, conventional wisdom is that the United States cannot simply disengage from the world. Advances in transportation, telecommunication, and weapons technologies combined with worldwide population growth and economic interdependency quite simply make it impossible for the United States to return to the pre-World War I, American preference for

isolationism. The well-known and often lamented fact that the United States is dependent on imported oil, natural gas, and other natural resources makes an isolationist strategy difficult if not entirely impractical.

Some might claim that energy independence is technologically feasible and only requires a greater degree of political commitment. While this may be true for the United States, it ignores the fact that most of our important trading partners are also dependent on foreign oil. U.S. energy independence does little for these countries. Most of the G8 countries are as dependent or have greater dependence on foreign oil than the United States.⁸⁶ Japan, as an example, is dependent on foreign oil completely. These countries could not withstand a major disruption in the flow of foreign oil and because our economies are interdependent, now more than ever, major disruptions in their economies would adversely affect the United States. Withdrawal from the world -- taking a much less active role in international politics -- increases the risk that the United States will be unable to influence unintended and unanticipated events.

Results of the Analysis

Based on the analysis above, the optimum strategy upon which to base American policies is cooperative security. This approach offers the highest potential benefits at the lowest cost and smallest probability of catastrophic failure -- a major confrontation between the People's Republic of China and the United States. Is this the current approach?

Current American Policy

Although Sino-American relations have often taken a backseat to more immediate concerns in the White House, the President addresses China at length in *The National Security Strategy of the United States*.⁸⁷ Indeed, no other country figures as prominently in the document. However, the document does not present a clear, unified strategy and leaves the reader wondering about the true nature of American strategy towards China. The reader finds more than one policy statement based on different objectives. On the one hand, the reader finds this section.

The United States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. The democratic development of China is crucial to the future. Yet, a quarter century after beginning the process of shedding the worst features of the Communist legacy, China's leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In time,

China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that greatness.⁸⁸

This section welcomes a “stable, peaceful, and prosperous China” and is in keeping with long stated goals of promoting freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity based on free trade, and free enterprise. The caveat is China should not develop “military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors.” However, in a later passage the reader finds, “The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy . . . to impose its will on the United States, our allies, and our friends.” The document continues, “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”⁸⁹ These quotes appear to put forward a strategy based on the objective of ensuring that the United States remains the only superpower. Several authors of articles on “American Imperialism” or “American Hegemony” use these quotes to support their view that American foreign policy supports primacy.⁹⁰ If the true desired national objective is American primacy, a reader --especially a Chinese leader -- may conclude that the United States does not actually welcome a stable and prosperous China. A Chinese leader may reason that the United States actually wants a weak China and will pursue policies toward that end. The reader must remember that the *National Security Strategy* dates from September 2002, not long after the 11 September 2001, attacks against the United States. The *National Security Strategy* naturally expresses the bellicose side of American foreign policy. An analyst must examine other policy statements to develop a more complete understanding of American policy towards China.

In September 2005, the Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, gave an important policy speech before the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations entitled, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”⁹¹ His remarks were insightful, rather specific, and well crafted. He stated that United States’ policy is to “integrate China as a full member of the international system . . . and also encourage China’s economic development through market reforms.”⁹² He quoted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at length,

The United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world. Indeed, we hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjusts to the international rules developed over the last century, but also joins us and others to address the challenges of the new century.⁹³

The main theme of the speech, repeated often since then, was that the policy of the United States towards China was transforming from simply drawing out and integrating China

into the international system to a policy intended to “urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.”⁹⁴ Zoellick stated that although United States policy was to “fence in” the Soviet Union, the policy towards China, for the past thirty years has been to “draw out” China.⁹⁵ He specifically repudiated the notion that a Cold War analogy is applicable.⁹⁶ This is a direct challenge to those who believe U.S. policy is or should be to pursue a ‘Grand Strategy’ of containment towards China similar to the American Cold War strategy of containment towards the Soviet Union. He also rejected “balance-of power” politics, stating that the world is too interconnected to “hold China at arm's length, hoping to promote other powers in Asia at its expense.”⁹⁷ He directed much of the speech to the domestic audience whom he challenged to ignore the “voices that perceive China solely through the lens of fear.”⁹⁸ He asked the audience to discard its fear and “look to the future as an opportunity.”⁹⁹ Zoellick concluded with,

We have many common interests with China. But relationships built only on a coincidence of interests have shallow roots. Relationships built on shared interests and shared values are deep and lasting. We can cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow.¹⁰⁰

The President, the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Christopher R. Hill have repeated the salient points of this speech during visits, press conferences, and testimony before various Congressional committees.¹⁰¹ Taken together, these statements indicate that the principal architects of American foreign policy are pursuing a strategy of cooperative security based on enduring American values. American policy is to welcome a “confident, peaceful, and prosperous China” and to integrate China into the international system as a “responsible stakeholder.” American policy makers are pursuing policies based on long-term, realistic objectives. They understand that cooperative security provides the best strategy for managing the challenges while pursuing the opportunities.

The Opportunities

All of the previously presented challenges have associated opportunities. These opportunities are like the opposite side of the coin. The United States and China share many common interests and almost limitless opportunities for cooperation. The first area of immense, shared opportunity is the potential for economic growth in both countries. Ignorant journalists and other observers place too much emphasis on the negative aspects of Sino-American economic competition. Free trade between China and the United States is mutually beneficial. American consumers receive quality products at lower cost. American industry and

manufacturing, faced with increased competition, innovate and find methods to achieve greater efficiency. Finally, China's accumulation of U.S. dollars – the result of their trade surpluses with the United States – is financing the American government's deficit spending. Free trade provides China with the foreign capital they need to grow their domestic economy. Chinese economic growth is export driven. They need access to the U. S. market. In *The World Is Flat*, chapter 5, "America and Free Trade," Friedman writes one of the most lucid, well reasoned, and immanently readable defenses of free trade.¹⁰² On the subject of the actual or perceived migration of American manufacturing jobs, Friedman notes that the issue is not new. American protectionists feared job migration to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s; and to Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. He astutely offers,

America integrated a broken Europe and Japan into the global economy after World War II, with both Europe and Japan every year upgrading their manufacturing, knowledge, and service skills, often importing and sometimes stealing ideas and equipment from the United States, just as America did from Britain in the late 1770s. Yet in the sixty years since World War II, our standard of living has increased every decade, and our unemployment rate -- even with all the outcry about outsourcing -- stands at only a little above 5 percent, roughly half that of the most developed countries in Western Europe.¹⁰³

Later, in the chapter Friedman addresses the misperception that global competition will lead inevitably to lower wages and a decreased standard of living for American workers. This is a common theme among United States labor leaders and their allies who oppose free trade. Advocates of this view frequently refer to their notion as a "race to the bottom."¹⁰⁴ Friedman believes, as do most prominent economists, that this idea is in error.

And always remember: *The Indians and Chinese are not racing us to the bottom. They are racing us to the top -- and that is a good thing!* They want higher standards of living, not sweatshops; they want brand names, not junk; they want to trade their motor scooters for cars and their pens and pencils for computers. And the more they do that, the higher they climb, the more room is created at the top -- because the more they have, the more they spend, the more diverse product markets become, and the more niches for specialization are created as well.¹⁰⁵

The bottom line is that Sino-American trade is presenting incredible economic opportunities. These economic opportunities point to another area of extraordinary opportunity. The United States and China share an interest in developing solutions to our mutual dependence on foreign oil. China and the United States have a tremendous opportunity to cooperate on a problem they share with the entire world. The world has a vested interest in seeing China follow a different path to a modern economy than was followed by Europe, the United States and the rest of the developed world. The impact on the global environment of 1.3

Billion Chinese adopting the same petroleum based behaviors as found in the United States may be catastrophic.

The United States and China share common interests in many areas. These common interests serve as a basis for continued cooperation. Beijing has taken a lead in negotiations with North Korea. Containing North Korea is important to both China and the United States. Both countries share a desire to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Washington and Beijing have a mutual interest in a stable Middle East because they both require oil from the region. China and the United States have overlapping interests “in fighting terrorism, building energy security, and reducing the risk of pandemic disease.”¹⁰⁶ These common interests can provide the foundation for a strategic partnership. Perhaps, in the near future, both countries can find ways to better cooperate and coordinate efforts in Africa, a region important to both countries. The opportunities for cooperation are almost limitless.

Recommendations

The preceding examination of Sino-American relations -- the change, challenges, and opportunities -- leads to the following recommendations. Over the course of the past fifty years, the American strategy towards China has evolved from containment, to selective engagement, to the current strategy that appears to have its theoretical underpinnings in cooperative security. The current administration has outlined a policy that specifically rejects isolationism (“neo” or otherwise) and selective engagement primarily because the world is too interconnected for these strategies to serve the greater long-term interests of the nation. The current strategy based upon cooperative security welcomes “a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China” as an integrated member and “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. This strategy is sound, logical, based upon a thorough analysis of the situation, and is in the best interests of the United States, China, and the world. The United States government can support the full implementation of this strategy and bolster its chances for success by taking action in the following six areas. The United States government should:

- Continue the stated policy, of welcoming a peaceful China into the world order as a responsible stakeholder.
- Energetically support the continuing evolution of the international order and the international institutions, treaties and agreements, which define that order.
- Continue to champion the cause of free trade.
- Reexamine its laws, rules, and procedures regarding the transfer of technology.
- Remain true to its enduring beliefs, ethics, and values regarding human rights.

- Continue to support Taiwan while seeking long-term solutions to the differences between Beijing and Taipei.

The current and future administrations should continue the stated policy, of welcoming a peaceful China into the world order as a responsible stakeholder. American policy makers must continue to approach Sino-American relations in a holistic, long-term manner. Current and future administrations should continue the stated policy of welcoming a peaceful China into the world order as a responsible stakeholder. To facilitate this desired objective, American leaders must continue to negotiate with Chinese leaders not based on their present status and power but rather based on their future likely prominence.

In general, the United States must hold true to its core values concerning free trade and economic development. The United States must continue to champion the cause of free trade. The United States must resist calls for “leveling the playing field” when this phrase is actually a euphemism for protectionism. In his article for *Far Eastern Economic Review*, titled, “America Dumps on Free Trade”, author and veteran Washington journalist, Greg Rushford, examines several example cases to show that the United States is often hypocritical on the issue of free trade.¹⁰⁷ In his examples, he shows that the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Congress use the provisions of U.S. law and the World Trade Organization's antidumping code to impose tariffs and other forms of protection to benefit domestic industries.¹⁰⁸ He writes that,

Antidumping advocates in Washington routinely speak of how these laws are needed to ensure the proverbial “level playing field” but everyone in the business knows the laws are administered to tilt that field to help domestic petitioning industries stick it to their foreign competitors.¹⁰⁹

The relationship will have to deal with substantive economic issues including: trade deficits, currency valuations (exchange rates), migration of manufacturing jobs (perceived loss of U.S. jobs), and protection of intellectual property rights (piracy of U.S. products). The best forums for dealing with these issues are the various international institutions the United States has helped create. In the end, a strong and prosperous China will present abundant economic opportunities to the United States and the rest of the world.

The United States must reexamine its laws, rules, and procedures regarding technology transfer. The United States will benefit directly and indirectly if China and the developing world use the best available technology to modernize. In the past, the United States tried through restrictions on the export of technology to prevent the People's Republic of China from acquiring nuclear weapons and advanced computer technology. In short order, China became a nuclear power and in less than a generation, China became a world leader in computing.

Supercomputers provide an interesting and illustrative example of the futility of attempts to prevent technology transfers to China. Steve Chen, an American born in Taiwan, was one of the best supercomputer designers in the United States.¹¹⁰ He now works for Galactic Computing Shenzhen Co. developing world-class supercomputers in China.¹¹¹ David Keyes, a Columbia University mathematics professor, assesses that in supercomputing technology China is already the “most ascending country in the world.”¹¹² In the long history of science and technology, attempts to prevent the migration of the best ideas have normally proven futile.

The United States must remain true to its enduring beliefs, ethics, and values regarding human rights. Human rights must remain a guiding principle in American foreign policy; however, policy makers must endeavor to see human rights through the eyes of Chinese leaders and consider Chinese culture and beliefs. The American concept of the primacy of the individual is a way but not the only way of structuring a society.¹¹³ The traditional Chinese idea that the needs of the family, group, or community take precedence over the individual is just as valid and moral.¹¹⁴ This simple construct may help Washington's strategic policy writers wrestle with appropriate responses to Chinese policies intended to control population growth and other human rights issues. It may help to keep in mind that the Chinese are feeding about twenty percent of the world's population with less than ten percent of the world's arable land.¹¹⁵

The United States government must continue to support Taiwan while seeking long-term solutions to the differences between Beijing and Taipei. In the recent past, during the run up to Taiwan's March 2005 presidential elections, tensions between Beijing and Taipei became very contentious. However, as noted by observers, economic ties continue to grow.¹¹⁶ In the long term, it may be possible to achieve a political relationship based on a federation. The best policy is to continue to stress with both parties that People's Republic of China and Taiwanese relations must continue to be a long-term process and not a single act.

Finally, the United States must continue to emphasize the many areas where Americans and Chinese can work towards the common good and deemphasize the areas that are prone to disagreement. As discussed previously, the United States and China share a common predicament based on their mutual dependency on foreign oil and reliance on burning coal for domestic electrical energy production. American and Chinese scientific expertise may be the world's one best prospect for finding a technical solution. Combined Sino-American scientific research is clearly in the best interest of both nations. The United States should pursue a policy of making academic study in the United States as easy as possible for Chinese students.

Conclusion

The emergence of China is fundamentally changing Sino-American relations and creating both challenges and opportunities for the 21st Century. American policy makers must conscientiously pursue a long-term approach to relations with China. The optimum strategy is a cooperative, collaborative approach that prepares the world stage for China's eventual emergence. Indeed, treating China as an enemy that must be contained, in the near term, will be a self-fulfilling prophesy in the long term. Perhaps, former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger expressed it best, "A policy that is perceived as having designated China as the enemy primarily because its economy is growing and its ideology is distasteful would end up isolating the United States."¹¹⁷ A collaborative approach works towards the establishment of an international system that will serve not only American and Chinese interests but those of all nations. In the words of Ambassador Roy,

Who can doubt that the world will be a better place if the United States and China can find the wisdom necessary to maintain cooperative and constructive bilateral relations as China continues on the path of peaceful development. Certainly, this should be an attainable goal if both countries keep in mind the advice of Shakespeare when he wrote: "O, it is excellent to have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant."¹¹⁸

The United States must continue working toward greater reliance on collective security, sacrificing short-term freedom of independent action for the long-term benefits of a changed world order. The world will be a better place for both Americans and Chinese if we collaborate in building a world order that constrains both the United States and China and establishes the conditions for cooperation between both countries. If the United States and China can cultivate this kind of relationship, perhaps historians will refer to the 21st Century not as the "Chinese Century" but rather as the "Pacific Century" and remember it as an age when two great powers worked together to solve the seemingly intractable problems of the world -- poverty, hunger, infant mortality, infectious disease, and environmental degradation.

Endnotes

¹ Many historians refer to the 20th Century as "The American Century." See for example, Harold Evans, *The American Century* (New York: Random House, 1998).

² Recent books on the emergence of China include: Ted C. Fishman, *China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World* (New York: Scribner, 2005); Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security*

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Robert G. Sutter, *China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

³ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook, China* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005); available from <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html>; Internet; accessed 2 November 2005.

⁴ Fishman, 1.

⁵ Ibid., 7.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Jean A. Garrison, "China's Prudent Cultivation of Soft Power and Implications for U.S. Policy in East Asia," *Asian Affairs, an American Review* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 25.

⁸ Benjamin Schwartz, "Managing China's Rise," *The Atlantic* 295, no. 5 (June 2005): 27-28.

⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, July 2005), 28, 44; available from http://www.dod.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719_china.pdf; Internet; accessed 1 February 2006. Also see *The World Factbook, China*.

¹⁰ "China in Brief, China in the World," linked from *China Internet Information Center*, available from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China2005/141824.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 November 2005.

¹¹ Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia-Pacific Security Issues and U.S. Policy," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26, no.4 (August 2004): 298.

¹² Andrei Davydov, "China in U.S. Contemporary Foreign Policy Strategy" *Far Eastern Affairs* 33, no. 3 (September 2005): 10, 17-20. See also Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no.6 (November/December 2003).

¹³ John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 3. There are numerous histories of China. Fairbank was an acknowledged expert in the field. This book is a solid introduction to Chinese history.

¹⁴ Ibid., 42-44.

¹⁵ Zheng Liren, "Ohio University Study on Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Population," 12 September 2002; available from http://www.library.ohiou.edu/subjects/shao/databases_popdis.htm; Internet; accessed 10 December 2005. Beijing values its outreach to overseas Chinese. See *The China Internet Information Center*, available from <http://www.china.org.cn/English>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005.

¹⁶ Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (November/December 1993): 60-61. See also, Xiaoxing Yi, "Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Understanding China's 'Peaceful Development'," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 19, no.1 (Spring/Summer 2005): 74-111.

¹⁷ Yi, 109.

¹⁸ The following books argue either as the central premise of the work or as a corollary that China will achieve peer or preeminence within the next twenty-five to fifty years: Fishman; and Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). For a somewhat countering argument former National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, "China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability (both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still constrained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide." Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books of Perseus Books Group, 2004): 3.

¹⁹ As an example, the PBS news show, "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer," ran a seven part series by correspondent Paul Solman. This excellent series included: "China's Growing Economy," aired 4 October 2005; "The Chinese Consumer," aired 5 October 2005; "Misinvestment in China," aired 11 October 2005; "Interview with Cheng Siwei," aired 12 October 2005; "Piracy Explored," aired 13 October 2005; and "Bumps in the Road?" aired 14 October 2005; all available from <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/china/>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2005. PBS also continued to run, "Is Wal-Mart good for America?: The China Connection," available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/china/trade.html>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2005.

²⁰ During the first week of September 2005, the retail price for a gallon of regular gasoline was over \$3 dollars. See, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, "Retail Gasoline Historical Prices," available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrpg/mogas_history.html; internet; accessed 26 November 2005. The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) dropped its offer for U.S. oil company, Unocal amid strong opposition in the Congress. See, Matt Pottinger, Russell Gold, Michael Phillips, and Kate Linebaugh, "Oil Politics: Cnooc Drops Offer for Unocal, Exposing U.S.-Chinese Tensions; Delay Imposed by Fierce Foes In Congress, Plus Missteps By Bidder, Doomed Move; Sale to Chevron All but Certain," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 August 2005, p. A.1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 26 November 2005. Qingdao Haier Company's attempted acquisition of Maytag also met with strong opposition. However, the bid failed primarily because Whirlpool Corporation made a better offer. See, Dennis K. Berman, Henny Sender, and Michael J. McCarthy, "China's Haier Is Said to Drop Offer for Maytag," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 July 2005, p. A.2 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 26 November 2005. In December 2004, the Chinese computer maker, Lenovo Group Ltd. bought IBM's personal computer division for \$1.75 billion. See, Charles Hutzler and Kate Linebaugh, "For Lenovo, a Bold Gambit; IBM Deal Highlights Prominence of Chinese Firm's Executives," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 December 2004, p.B.2 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 26 November 2005. In 2005, "lawmakers from both parties stockpiled bills to punish China, . . ." See, Jonathan Weisemen and Peter S Goodman, "China's Oil Bid Riles Congress; Attempt to Take Over U.S. Firm Spurs Calls for Retaliation," *The Washington Post*, 24 June 2005, p. A.01; [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 26 November 2005. Chinese President Hu Jintao planned an official visit to the United States for September 2005. The visit was postponed because of Hurricane Katrina. See, "World In Brief," *The Washington Post*, 4 September 2005, p. A19 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 26 November 2005. President Bush visited China in November 2005. See, "President's Trip to

Asia, 15-21 November 2005, Japan, Korea, China, Mongolia," available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/asia/2005/>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2006.

²¹ Friedman.

²² Ibid. The entire book is germane. The following sections are particularly important; "Offshoring," 114-127; "America and Free Trade," 225-236; and "The Virgin of Guadalupe," 301-336.

²³ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Brief – China" (August 2005); available from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005. See also U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, "International Energy Outlook 2005" (July 2005); available from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005. (This report includes this note on the demand for oil imports, "Demand in the emerging economies rose by almost 1.9 million barrels per day, with China accounting for more than one-half of that increase.")

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The 8 June 2005, press release announcing the Schumer-Graham China Free Trade Bill and Senate hearings on the issue of China trade is available from <http://shumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/pr-archives.html>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2006. (As of February 2006, this bill has been renamed, "The China Currency Bill", S.295).

²⁶ Former Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill is credited with the phrase, "all politics are local politics". Thomas O'Neill with Gary Hymel, *All Politics is Local and Other Rules of the Game* (Holbrook, MA.: Bob Adams Inc., 1994). "It's the economy, stupid." is associated widely with President Clinton's first run for the office in 1992.

²⁷ Roger Lowenstein, "The Yuan Also Rises," *Smart Money* (October 2005): 60. The Renminbi Yuan is the official currency of the People's Republic of China.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Robert A Scalapino, "Asia-Pacific Security Issues and U.S. Policy," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26, no.4 (August 2004): 297.

³¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005" available from http://www.dod.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719_china.pdf; Internet; accessed February 2006.

³² Bill Gertz, *The China Threat: How the People's Republic targets America* (Washington D.C.: Regency Publishing Inc., 2002); Steven Mosher, *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); and Robert D. Kaplan, "How We Would Fight China", *The Atlantic* 295, no. 5 (June 2005): 49-64. The best-researched and reasoned book on China as a threat is Constantine C. Menges, *China: the Gathering Threat* (Nashville, TN: Nelson Current, 2005).

³³ Scalapino, 298.

³⁴ *Taiwan Relations Act*, U.S. Code, Title 22, Chap. 48, sec. 3301-3316 (1979); available from http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html; Internet: accessed 25 January 2006.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Scalapino, 299. The elections were in March 2004.

³⁷ Scalapino 298.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1997): 5-53.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 6.

⁴¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993):83.

⁴² Posen and Ross, 6.

⁴³ Ibid., 23-24.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 24.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 25.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 26.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 18.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al., *The United States and a Rising China* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999): 72.

⁵² Ibid., 87.

⁵³ Posen and Ross, 12.

⁵⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books of Perseus Books Group, 2004).

⁵⁵ Doug Bandow, "Keeping the Troops and Money at Home" *Current History*, no. 579 (January 1994): 10; quoted in Posen and Ross, 12.

⁵⁶ Posen and Ross, 12.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 13.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia-Pacific Security Issues and U.S. Policy," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26, no. 4 (August 2004): 297.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no.5 (September/October 2005): 25-39.

⁶³ Erica Strecker Downs, *China's Quest for Energy Security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997): 53-54.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Brief – China" (August 2005); available from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005.

⁶⁵ Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" *Policy Analysis*, no. 465 (January 2003): 12.

⁶⁶ David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 2003). See also, Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," *National Interest*, no. 56(Summer 1999).

⁶⁷ In addition to the views of Ivan Eland and David Shambaugh cited immediately above see, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005" available from <http://www.dod.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf>; Internet: accessed 18 February 2006. This report states in the executive summary, "We assess that China's ability to project conventional military power beyond its periphery remains limited." It is only in the long term that the authors assess a potential problem, "Over the long term, if the current trend persists, PLA capabilities could pose a credible threat to the modern militaries operating in the region."

⁶⁸ J. Stapleton Roy, "The Rise of China and the Outlook for U.S. – China Relations," Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture on Sino-American Relations, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, 28 February 2005; available from http://shanghai.usconsulate.gov/barnett-oksenberg_lecture.html; Internet; accessed 17 December 2005; also available from <http://www.ncuscr.org/articlesandspeeches/Ambassador%20Roy%20-%20Barnett%20Oksenberg%20Lecture%202005.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ *The World Factbook, China.*

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Roy.

⁷³ Posen and Ross, 40.

⁷⁴ As a planning figure an additional 10,000 soldiers requires an additional one billion dollars.

⁷⁵ The Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, "The Long-Term Budget Outlook" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Printing Office, December 2005); available from <http://www.cbo.gov>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2006.

⁷⁶ Roy.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Fishman, 6.

⁷⁹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt coined the name "United Nations." The United States was its principal architect and champion. "The United Nations was mainly an American idea, and its structure today closely follows the plans prepared by American diplomats during World War II." Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 3.

⁸⁰ James C. Hsiung, "Sea Power, the Law of the Sea, and the Sino-Japanese East China Sea 'Resource War'," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 27, no.6 (December 2005): 525. For a further examination of the international economic system, see Paul A Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, *Macroeconomics*, 13th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1989), 515-522.

⁸¹ Davydov, 18.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid., 17.

⁸⁴ Posen and Ross, 19.

⁸⁵ United Nations, *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, December 2004): 62.

⁸⁶ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook, Rank Order Oil Imports* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005); available from <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2175rank.html>; Internet; accessed 2 November 2005.

⁸⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002).

⁸⁸ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 30.

⁹⁰ See for example, Elke Krahmann, "American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of International Security," *International Studies Review* 7, no. 4 (December 2005): 539.

⁹¹ Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" Remarks presented to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, 21 September 2005, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2005.

⁹² Ibid., 1.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 1.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 5.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ See for example, Condoleeza Rice, "Press Briefing," China World Hotel, Beijing, China, 20 November 2005; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/print/20051120-8.html>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2006. In an earlier speech, the Secretary of Defense stated, "The United States welcomes the emergence of a peaceful and prosperous China that is a responsible partner in the international system." Donald H. Rumsfeld, Prepared Remarks at the Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing, China, 20 October 2005; <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2005/sp20051020-secdef2041.html>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2006.

¹⁰² Friedman, 225-236.

¹⁰³ Friedman, 231.

¹⁰⁴ There are numerous books and articles on the subject of "the race to the bottom." See Alan Tonelson, *The Race to the Bottom: Why a Worldwide Worker Surplus and Uncontrolled Free Trade are Sinking American Living Standards* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).

¹⁰⁵ Friedman, 233.

¹⁰⁶ Robert B. Zoellick, "Statement on Conclusion of the Second U.S.-China Senior Dialogue," Washington D.C., 8 December 2005; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57822>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2006.

¹⁰⁷ Greg Rushford. "America Dumps On Free Trade," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 168, no. 11 (December 2005): 18-23.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 21.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 23.

¹¹⁰ Fishman, 281.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 281.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ The issue of collective (group) rights versus individual rights is difficult and complex. McMaster University professor, Rhoda E. Howard notes that there are several communitarian challenges to the concept of individual rights: "... they frequently express a preference for group rather than individual rights." See, Rhoda E. Howard, "Human Rights and the Search for Community," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no.1 (1995): 2. On the primacy of the individual in Western tradition see, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 71-72. Samuel Huntington lists individualism as a distinguishing characteristic of Western society: "Individualism remains a distinguishing mark of the West among twentieth-century civilizations." He further notes, "Again and again both Westerners and non-Westerners point to individualism as the central distinguishing mark of the West." Huntington argues, "it is false; it is immoral and it is dangerous" to view the Western emphasis on individualism as universal. (p.310)

¹¹⁴ Harvard professor, Amartya Sen argues, "Authoritarian readings of Asian values that are increasingly being championed in some quarters do not survive scrutiny. The thesis of a grand dichotomy between Asian values and European values adds little to our comprehension, and much to the confusion about the normative basis of freedom and democracy." Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values," Sixteenth Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997): 31: available from http://www.cceia.org/media/254_sen.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 March 2006.

¹¹⁵ *The World Factbook, China*.

¹¹⁶ Scalapino, 298.

¹¹⁷ Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2001), 135. For Kissinger's examination of Sino American relations see, 134-53, 161-162.

¹¹⁸ Roy.